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I.  IN RE ESTATE OF BOZARTH 
Reversing the lower court on a narrow issue of law, the Illinois 
Appellate Court for the Fourth District recently held that when life-estate 
property consists of financial assets, a life tenant is entitled to consume only 
the interest that accrues during her lifetime, but not the principal.1  
 
In October 1974, Harold Bozarth executed a will.2  Harold’s will 
provided: 
 
After the payment of my just debts and burial expenses, I will, devise and 
bequeath all of my property of every kind, nature, and description, and 
wherever situated, and any property in which I have an interest, to my 
beloved wife, Frances Bozarth[,] to be hers to use and enjoy for and 
during the term of her natural lifetime. 
… 
At the death of my wife, all that remains of my estate . . . I will, devise[,] 
and bequeath the same to any trustee nominated by my said wife, . . . and 
all such property shall be held for the benefit of my son[,] Robert F. 
Bozarth[,] and the heirs of his body until the youngest of his children 
attains the age of forty years, at which time the entire corpus, and any 
                                                     
1.  In re Estate of Bozarth, 2014 IL App (4th) 130309, ¶ 42. 
2.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
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accumulation, shall be distributed equally among my grandchildren, after 
which the trust shall cease.3 
Harold died in 1983.4  In August 1984, as executrix of Harold’s estate, 
Frances Bozarth filed a final report wherein she stated that she personally 
received “mortgages, notes and cash” worth a total of $100,800.79.5  
Additionally, pursuant to Harold’s will, she reported that Robert, Harold’s 
son from a prior marriage, received $5,000 and $23,555.44 was used to pay 
Harold’s end-of-life expenses.6 
Frances died in October 2010.7  In the petition to have her will 
probated, Robert stated that Frances’s estate included approximately 
$257,274.46 in personal property and $780,000 in real property.8  
Robert died in September 2011.9    In June 2011, Robert’s children 
filed four claims against Frances’s estate, including the claim at issue in the 
appeal at bar.10  In January 2013, the trial court denied all of petitioners’ 
claims.11   
With respect to the claim at issue on appeal, the trial court explained 
that the petitioners’ claim for $100,800.79 failed for two reasons.12  First, 
petitioners had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence what exactly 
the personal property listed in Frances’s final report consisted of.13  
Secondly, even if the petitioners had successfully identified the property, as 
the life tenant, Frances had the right to consume the property in the life 
estate because the property cannot be enjoyed without consuming it.14 
On appeal, petitioners asserted that as the remaindermen of Harold’s 
will, they were entitled to the personal property that Frances had received 
from Harold and held as a life tenant.15  Specifically, the petitioners 
asserted that they were entitled to (1) “mortgages, notes and cash in the 
amount of $100,800.79.”16 Petitioners also claimed to be entitled to 
“personal property, including grain and other personal property in the 
amount of $67,248.38.”17  However, because petitioners failed to challenge 
                                                     
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
5.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
6.  Id.  
7.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
10.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
11.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
12.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. ¶¶ 25–28. 
16.  Id. ¶ 15. 
17.  Id. 
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the lower court’s adverse ruling as to the $67,248.38, the appellate court 
promptly disposed of that prong of petitioners’ claim, ruling that the 
petitioners forfeited that portion of their claim.18 
Reversing the lower court, the appellate court explained that 
“[a]lthough it might seem plain that the right to “use and enjoy” life-estate 
property would include the right to liquidate and spend the financial assets 
at issue, Illinois law provides otherwise.”19  In Illinois, when life-estate 
property consists of cash or its equivalent—such as the Corn Belt Bank 
assets in this case—the life tenant is entitled to consume the interest that 
accrues during her lifetime, but not the principal.20  To be entitled to 
consume principle, Harold would have had to have stated expressly that 
Frances was authorized to consume principle.21 
The appellate court relied on Quigley v. Quigley.22  In Quigley, the life 
estate at issue consisted of $29,000 worth of capital stock in various 
corporations, bank deposits, checks, and a promissory note.23  The Quigley 
court held that the language bequeathing the property to the testator’s 
brother “‘for his personal use during his lifetime’” was insufficient to vest 
the brother with the right to consume the financial assets at issue.24  The 
Quigley court was of the opinion “that a gift ‘for his personal use during his 
lifetime’ has no different meaning than ‘for life.’”25  The appellate court 
found no distinction between the will’s language in Quigley and the 
language of Harold’s will bequeathing property to Frances “to be hers to 
use and enjoy for and during the term of her natural lifetime.”26 
Thus, as remaindermen, the petitioners were indeed entitled to 
$100,800.79.27  This sum is equivalent to the value of the financial assets 
that entered into the life-estate corpus at the inception of the life-tenancy 
period. Only the interest or return on investment that may have accrued 
from the financial assets during Frances’s lifetime was hers to use and 
enjoy. 
Harold’s will created a life estate.  According to the appellate court, an 
Illinois life estate does not allow for the consumption of principle.28  If it is 
the intent of the grantor to allow the use of principle then the life estate 
                                                     
18.  Id.  
19.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
20.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
21.  See id. at ¶ 43. 
22.  Id. at ¶ 41. 
23.  370 Ill. 151, 152, 18 N.E.2d 186, 187 (1938).  
24.  Id.  
25.  Id. 
26.  Bozarth, 2014 IL App (4th) 130309, ¶ 38. 
27.  Id. at ¶ 44. 
28.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
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must specifically authorize such distribution.  Regardless, the law in Illinois 
strictly construed what a life estate includes. 
 
II. IN RE ESTATE OF ZAGARIA 
A. Introduction 
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District ruled that where a 
“presumed dead” respondent is subsequently discovered alive, said 
respondent is required to pay attorneys’ fees incurred in administering the 
estate from assets returned to him from the now-closed probate estate.29 
Interestingly, a majority of the Zagaria court found both statutorily-
based fee obligations and equitable principles demanded that respondent 
pay attorneys’ fees incurred administering his estate from his personal 
estate.30  The Zagaria dissent agreed that statutorily-based fee obligations 
arose, however, the dissent disagreed that in this instance respondent is 
responsible to pay said fees.31  Instead, the dissent explains, equity demands 
that the administrator of the now-closed estate, who benefitted greatly from 
the estate, should pay the attorneys’ fees.32  
B. Facts 
Samuel N. Zagaria, Jr. had no contact with his friends or family for 
over seven years.33  His sister, Joanne Corlett, filed a petition with the 
probate court for letters of administration upon a presumption of death.34   
Upon finding that Zagaria had been neither seen nor heard from since 
August 10, 2000, and upon diligent inquiry could not be found, the court 
ruled that the facts created a presumption in law that Zagaria died intestate 
on August 10, 2007.35  The court issued letters of office of the presumed-
dead estate of Zagaria and appointed Corlett as independent administrator.36 
The primary estate asset was a stock account worth about $500,000.00.37  
Attorneys hired by Corlett prepared missing personal tax returns for 
Zagaria.38  They recovered unclaimed assets owned by Zagaria that were 
                                                     
29.  In re Estate of Zagaria, 2013 IL App (1st) 122879, ¶ 38. 
30.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
31.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
32.  Id. at ¶¶ 67–68. 
33.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
34.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id.  
37.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
38.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
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held by the State of Illinois.39  Additionally, the attorneys attempted to 
collect annuity benefits owed to Zagaria.40  To collect the annuity benefits, 
the attorneys were required to produce a “presumed-dead death 
certificate.”41  When the attorneys contacted government officials to obtain 
such a certificate, they learned that someone had filed an application for 
public assistance using Zagaria’s social security number.42   This discovery 
ultimately lead to confirmation on June 8, 2010 that Zagaria was indeed 
still alive.43 
On August 26, 2010, counsel for Zagaria filed a motion to revoke 
letters of administration.44   On September 1, 2010, the court revoked the 
presumption of death and letters of administration.45  The court also ordered 
Corlett to provide a full accounting of the estate and to turn over all 
remaining funds in an original stock account to Zagaria.46  At this time, the 
estate was worth $366,000.00.47  As the dissent explains, it is undisputed 
that during the pendency of the estate Corlett, as administrator, made 
multiple distributions to herself.48 
The attorneys hired by Corlett continued to work to close the estate.49  
During this time, they did not make a request for fees nor did they seek 
guidance from the court regarding the proper procedure for handling this 
unique set of circumstances.50  The attorneys sent the final accounting of 
the estate to the court on November 4, 2010.51  Five and a half months later, 
on April 21, 2011, the attorneys filed a petition for attorney fees and costs 
totaling $30,859.21.52 
On April 11, 2012, the court entered an order finding that the 
attorneys’ fees and expenses were fair and reasonable and imposed 
judgment against the estate for $27,359.21.53  On September 6, 2011, 
Zagaria filed an opposition to the fee petition.54  Upon learning that Zagaria 
had a new stock account, the attorneys filed a motion for turnover of funds 
to satisfy the fee award judgment.55  On June 1, 2012 the court froze the 
                                                     
39.  Id.  
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
43.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
44.  Id.  
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
47.  Id. at ¶ 59. 
48.  Id.  
49.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
50.  Id.; see also id. ¶ 56.  
51.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
52.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
53.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
54.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
55.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
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amount of the judgment in Zagaria’s new stock account.56  On August 29, 
2012, the court allowed the motion for turnover against Zagaria.57  Zagaria 
appealed.58  
On appeal, Zagaria argued “(1) petitioners failed to show cause to 
attach his nonprobate assets; (2) his claim to the estate property is superior 
to the petitioners’ claim; and (3) the trial court’s order is not supported by 
existing law.”59  “Alternatively, Zagaria argue[d] that if he is liable for 
attorney fees incurred in the administration of the estate, the attorneys for 
the estate owed him a fiduciary duty, and the trial court’s finding to the 
contrary should be reversed.”60 
C. Analysis 
The Zagaria court recognized that administration of an estate upon a 
legal presumption of death is indeed permissible under section 9-6 of the 
Illinois Probate Act.61  Furthermore, the court explained that such an estate 
is administered in the same fashion as an estate of one proved dead by other 
means.62  Once the estate is opened, the estate administrator is entitled to 
the assistance of an attorney and said attorney is entitled to be paid for his 
or her services.63  Additionally, as the majority explains, the attorney’s 
compensation for his or her work performed on behalf of the estate is paid 
from the estate assets.64 
The majority then highlights that pursuant to section 18-12 of the 
Illinois Probate Act, funds that were once held by the estate but which are 
no longer in the administrator’s possession are nonetheless subject to claims 
against the estate to the extent that the distributee’s share of the estate is not 
diminished below what the distributee would have received had the claim 
been paid by the estate representative.65  
Although in this instance the estate was closed and the estate funds 
had already been returned to Zagaria, the majority found that the funds in 
the new stock account owned by Zagaria once belonged to the estate.66  
This fact is undisputed by the dissent.67  Thus, following the estate funds to 
                                                     
56.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
62. Id. at ¶ 20. 
63.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
64.  Id.  
65.  Id. at ¶ 16; see also 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-12(d) (2010). 
66.  Zagaria, 2013 IL App (1st) 122879, ¶ 28. 
67.  Id.  
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Zagaria, the majority shows little hesitation in holding that Zagaria should 
be required to pay the attorney fees incurred in administering the estate.68   
Relying on principles of equity, the majority offers further support for 
its conclusion stating if a person received a benefit from another, he is 
liable for payment.69 
D. Dissent 
In the dissent’s view, “while a court of review must follow the 
letter and spirit of the law, it must also seek to infuse its rulings with justice 
and equity.”70  Corlett, as estate administrator, benefitted greatly from the 
estate.  When she opened the estate it was worth $518,000, by the time the 
letters of office were revoked the estate had dwindled to $366,000.71   
After finding Zagaria alive, the dissent points out that the attorneys 
for the estate took no steps to seek the court’s guidance regarding the 
proper procedure for closing the “presumed dead” probate estate.72  
Furthermore, the estate attorneys never sought payments of expenses and 
fees within the parameters of the estate while the matter was actively 
pending, rather the attorneys waited a considerable length of time before 
filing to recover fees and expenses.73  
Using the same equitable principles relied upon by the majority, the 
dissent would find that because Corlett benefitted greatly from 
administration of the “presumed-dead estate,” she too should pay for that 
benefit.74  
The dissent believes that the estate funds which were distributed to 
Corlett, especially those which she took after it became likely that Zagaria 
was alive, should be considered constructively held in trust by Corlett for 
the benefit of the estate.75 
The dissent asserts that “[t]he outcome of this case leaves the 
impression that the courts have chosen to rescue the attorneys from a 
situation which is of their own making and reward Corlett for her personal 
use of estate funds.”76 
  
                                                     
68.  Id. at ¶ 51. 
69.  Id. at ¶¶ 42–44. 
70.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
71.  Id. at ¶ 59. 
72.  Id. at ¶ 56. 
73.  Id.  
74.  Id. at ¶ 68. 
75.  Id. at ¶ 65. 
76.  Id. at ¶ 67. 
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E. Conclusion 
  Although the appellate court offers little discussion of Corlett’s and 
the estate attorneys’ efforts to locate Mr. Zagaria prior to the presumed 
dead ruling, one must acknowledge that “diligent effort” was found by the 
lower court as the court-made “seven-year rule” requires “a diligent 
search.”  Given this, it is understandable why the court awarded fees and 
ordered the previous “estate funds” be used to pay said fees.  Without such 
an award of fees, the chilling effect on the administration of presumed dead 
estates would be substantial as likely few people would be willing to risk 
administering these types of estates. 
III. SPECIAL NEEDS DECANTING  
A. Introduction 
On January 1, 2013, Section 16.4 of the Illinois Trusts and Trustees 
Act became effective, codifying in Illinois what has become commonly 
known as “decanting.”77  Formally titled “Distribution of Trust Principal in 
Further Trust,” Section 16.4 validated a trustee power that was already 
intuitively inherent under common law.  The power to decant permits an 
authorized trustee of an existing irrevocable trust (the “first trust”) to find or 
create a new or separate trust (the “second trust”) and pour—as one pours 
wine from the bottle into a decanter—the assets of the first trust into the 
second trust.  Recognizing the potential benefit to special needs planning, 
the drafters of the decanting statute included procedures specifically aimed 
at using decanting for the benefit of trust beneficiaries who have 
disabilities, including maximizing a disabled beneficiary’s ability qualify 
for valuable, need-based government benefits including Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid. 
The potential benefit of decanting in a special needs trust setting is 
simple: where the terms of the first trust reduce or eliminate a disabled 
beneficiary’s potential to qualify for government benefits or otherwise are 
not in the disabled beneficiary’s best interest, the trustee may decant to a 
second trust whose terms effectively increase the benefits available to the 
disabled beneficiary or, at the least, cause the trust to be administered in a 
manner that is in the beneficiary’s better interests.  Of course, how this feat 
is accomplished, and in what manner, is a bit more complex.  A trustee 
considering decanting for the benefit of a special needs beneficiary may 
have multiple avenues at hand to do so.  This article is intended to give a 
brief overview of the decanting process in general, explain the methods by 
                                                     
77.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT.  5/16.4 (2013). 
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which a trustee may decant in a special needs context, overview some of the 
potential problems with decanting in this context, and review examples of 
special needs decanting to aid the reader in understanding how special 
needs decanting may work.  
B. A Decanting Primer78 
Before considering the provisions of the decanting statute specifically 
addressing special needs decanting, it is necessary first to understand the 
basic decanting process.  At its simplest, decanting is the act of “pouring” 
the principal of one trust into a different trust.  The second trust need not be 
a new trust, nor need it be created by the trustee of the first trust.  Rather, 
the trustee’s authority to decant is drawn from the discretion granted him 
under the first trust document, and, as one might imagine, the broader the 
trustee’s discretion, the broader the trustee’s authority to decant.  
In general, decanting is one of a few tools in the trustee’s “toolbox” 
for modifying trust provisions either to assist in the proper administration of 
the trust or to better effectuate the settlor’s wishes.79  Among other things, 
trust decanting may be useful to modify administrative and investment 
provisions, modify fiduciary appointment and succession provisions, 
change applicable law, convert certain trusts to more favorable trust forms, 
add or remove spendthrift provisions, adjust to changing tax laws or 
environments, and of course, protect assets for the use of beneficiaries, 
including special needs beneficiaries.  
To decant, the trustee must first be an “authorized trustee;” that is, the 
trustee must have the authority to distribute principal of the trust.80  Where 
a trustee’s discretion is limited only to distributions of income, the trustee is 
not an “authorized trustee,” and may not decant.  Assuming that the trustee 
has some authority to distribute principal, the trustee’s ability to decant is 
defined by the breadth of the trustee’s discretion to distribute trust principal. 
Where a trustee has absolute discretion to distribute trust principal, the 
trustee’s ability to decant is very broad.81  Alternatively, where a trustee’s 
                                                     
78.  For a broader review of decanting in Illinois, in general, see Susan T. Bart, Jennifer L. Bunker & 
Sonia D. Coleman, Survey of Illinois Law: Trusts and Estates, Section III, Decanting: Refining a 
Vintage Trust, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 615 (2014). 
79.  Other tools include trust revision via a virtual representation agreement, see 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/16.1 (2013) (authorizing virtual representation agreements in Illinois), trust merger, and trust 
division.  
80.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(a) (2013) (“‘Authorized trustee’ means an entity or individual, other 
than the settlor, who has authority under the terms of the first trust to distribute the principal of the 
trust for the benefit of one or more current beneficiaries.”). 
81. See id. § 5/16.4(c) (2013) (governing the trustee’s ability to decant when the trustee absolute 
discretion).  
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discretion to distribute principal is narrow, his ability to decant is likewise 
narrow.82 
1. Trustee with Absolute Discretion 
Where a trustee has absolute discretion, his authority to decant is 
controlled by Section 16.4(c) of the decanting statute.  A trustee with 
“absolute discretion” has “the right to distribute principal that is not limited 
or modified in any manner to or for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries 
of the trust…”83  A trustee whose authority is described as “best interests,” 
“welfare,” or “happiness,” is generally considered to have absolute 
discretion.84 
Under Section 16.4(c), a trustee may distribute the assets of the first 
trust into a second trust for the benefit of one, some, or all of the current 
trust beneficiaries, and for the benefit of one, some, or all of the remainder 
beneficiaries.85  Accordingly, the beneficiaries of the first trust need not all 
be beneficiaries of the second trust, although they can be.  The trustee may 
also grant a power of appointment to one, some, or all of the current 
beneficiaries if the beneficiary was entitled to outright distribution under 
the first trust, and the power of appointment may give the beneficiary broad 
discretion to select beneficiaries.86  The trustee with absolute discretion is 
otherwise restricted only by those limitations found in the remainder of 
Section 16.4, which significant restrictions are discussed in Section B(3) 
infra, or in the trust document itself. 
2. Trustee with Less than Absolute Discretion 
Conversely, a trustee who does not have absolute discretion to 
distribute trust principal is significantly more limited in his authority to 
decant.  Subsection 16.4(d) controls decanting in a situation where the 
trustee’s authority does not meet the ‘absolute discretion’ definition 
discussed above.87  In that case, the trustee may decant to a second trust 
only if: (1) the second trust has the same current beneficiaries and the same 
successor and remainder beneficiaries as the first trust; (1) the second trust 
has the same beneficiary class members as the first trust; and (3) the second 
trust includes all powers of appointment of the first trust.88  In other words, 
                                                     
82. See id. § 5/16.4(d) (governing the trustee’s ability to decant when the trustee has less than 
absolute discretion). 
83.  Id. § 5/16.4(a) (defines “absolute discretion”). 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. § 5/16.4(c). 
86.  Id. §§ 5/16.4(c)(1)-(2). 
87.  Id. § 5/16.4(d). 
88.  Id. §§ 5/16.4(d)(1)-(3). 
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the trustee decanting under Subsection (d) may not decant in a way that 
alters the trust’s distributive terms or beneficiaries.  However, the trustee 
without absolute discretion may still decant for a number of reasons other 
than altering the trust’s distributive terms, such as altering administrative 
terms, correcting fiduciary succession provisions, and the like.  Like a 
trustee decanting under Subsection (c), the trustee decanting under 
Subsection (d) is also limited by the restrictions found in other parts of 
Section 16.4, discussed below, and in the trust instrument.  
3. Limitations on the Trustee’s Ability to Decant 
In addition to any restrictions on decanting found in the trust 
document, Section 16.4 includes several specific limitations on the terms of 
the Second Trust designed to both restrict and protect the trustee.  Two 
particular limitations are notable when discussing special needs decanting. 
First, Subsection 16.4(n)(1) provides that a second trust may not reduce, 
limit or modify a beneficiary’s mandatory distribution or right of 
withdrawal, except where the second trust is a supplemental needs trust.89 
As discussed further in Section C, infra, this exception for supplemental 
needs second trusts is crucial to the concept of “special needs decanting” 
and may even be unique to Illinois’ decanting statute.  Second, Subsection 
16.4(o) limits the trustee’s ability to decant where doing so would subject 
the second trust to claims of reimbursement by a private or governmental 
body or reduce or jeopardize an individual’s right to government benefits.90 
As discussed later in Section C, infra, this restriction is significant because 
it creates an ambiguity when decanting to a supplemental needs second 
trust with payback provisions. 
In general, the terms of the second trust must further the purposes of 
the second trust.91  The second trust may have a term longer than that of the 
first trust; however the second trust must have the same permissible rule 
against perpetuities as the first trust.92  Assets belonging to the first trust 
that are discovered after decanting must be included in the decanting, but 
assets acquired by the first trust after decanting remain assets of the first 
trust.93  In addition, the trustee may not decant if decanting is specifically 
prohibited by the first trust.94 The trustee, generally, may not alter his own 
liability, compensation, or eliminate a right to remove the trustee.95  And 
                                                     
89.  Id.  § 5/6.4(n)(1). 
90.  Id. § 5/16.4(o). 
91.  Id. § 5/16.4(b). 
92.  Id. § 5/16.4(g). 
93.  Id. § 5/16.4(i). 
94.  Id. § 5/16.4(m) (a spendthrift clause alone does not prohibit decanting).  
95.  Id. §§ 5/16.4(n)(2)-(3) & § 5/16.4(q). 
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finally, the trustee must comply with certain notice provisions or seek court 
approval before decanting.96 
4. The Process of Decanting 
Briefly, a few notes on the process required to decant. The 
“decanting” must be made by a written instrument, signed and 
acknowledged by the trustee, and filed with the records of the first trust and 
second trust.97  Court approval and consent of the beneficiaries to the 
decanting is not required but only if there are one or more legally competent 
current beneficiaries and one or more legally competent presumptive 
remainder beneficiaries of the first trust and notice of the intended 
distribution is given to all legally competent beneficiaries.98  If no recipient 
of the notice objects within 60 days, the trustee may decant.  If a 
beneficiary objects to the decanting within 60 days or if notice cannot be 
made because there are no legally competent current and/or remainder 
beneficiaries of the first trust, the trustee may seek court approval of the 
decanting by filing a petition to order the proposed distribution.99 A trust 
beneficiary may also file a written objection with the court.100 The trustee 
has the burden of proving that the proposed decanting furthers the purposes 
of the trust.101 
C. Decanting for Special Needs Beneficiaries 
Having reviewed the decanting process generally, let us explore how 
decanting can be useful in a special needs context.  A general understanding 
of special needs estate and trust planning is required.  When considering 
“special needs planning,” the central concern is generally maximizing the 
disabled individual’s ability to qualify for governmental benefits.  Although 
some benefits may be available to the disabled person simply by virtue of 
their disability, additional, valuable benefits are available where the 
disabled person is considered “low income.”  These “need-based” benefits, 
including SSI and Medicaid, are available only to qualifying persons102 
whose monthly income and assets fall under a defined statutory cap.103  If a 
                                                     
96.  Id. § 6/16.4(e).  
97.  Id. § 5/16.4(r).  
98.  Id. §§ 5/16.4(e)(1)-(2). 
99.  Id. § 16.4(f).  
100.  Id. § 16.4(f)(2). 
101.  Id. 
102.  For SSI, qualifying individuals are: a) 65 years or older; b) blind in both eyes; or c) disabled, as 
that term is defined in Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2014). 
103.  To qualify for SSI, an individual’s assets must not have a cumulative value greater than $2,000 
(excepting the house the individual lives in and one vehicle).  42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2014).  
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disabled individual’s income or assets exceed the defined cap, the 
individual must “spend down” those resources before he will be eligible for 
need-based benefits.104 
The use of third party and special needs trusts has evolved as a 
method of maximizing a disabled individual’s ability to receive government 
benefits where income or assets already owned by the beneficiary might 
otherwise prevent the disabled individual from qualifying for need-based 
benefits.  Where a disabled individual is already the named beneficiary of a 
trust whose terms require payment of income or distributions of principal to 
the disabled individual, the trust will likely prevent the disabled beneficiary 
from qualifying for need-based benefits. Where that is the case, decanting 
to a supplemental needs second trust for the benefit of the disabled 
individual is a possible method by which the trustee can help the disabled 
beneficiary qualify for need-based benefits without having to spend down 
the trust assets, thereby retaining those assets for other “supplemental” 
needs of the disabled individual. 
Disabled beneficiaries in Illinois are at an advantage over those in 
other states.  Lawmakers in Illinois anticipated that a trustee might need to 
decant to a supplemental needs second trust, or otherwise decant for the 
benefit of a disabled beneficiary.  Recognizing the unique challenges that 
might arise where a trustee attempted to decant to a supplemental needs 
second trust using “traditional” decanting methods, the drafters of Section 
16.4 included a specific provision, Subsection 16.4(d)(4), that permits a 
trustee to decant to a supplemental needs second trust even though the 
decanting may limit the beneficiary’s rights to distributions from the trust 
and even though the decanting may expand the trustee’s discretion.105  In 
fact, a trustee decanting under Subsection (d)(4) may go so far as to 
eliminate a disabled beneficiary’s right to income or principal altogether if 
it appears that doing so will increase the beneficiary’s ability to qualify for 
government assistance.106  While these provisions seem intuitive, it appears 
that Illinois is nearly unique, as one of only a few states whose decanting 
                                                     
104.  Social Security Act Program Operations Manual § SI 01150.007 (2013), Rule 12.9.5. 
105.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(d)(4) (2013). 
106.  See id. § 5/16.4(n)(1), which provides: (n) Restrictions.  An authorized trustee may not exercise a 
power authorized by subsection (c) or (d) to affect any of the following: (1) to reduce, limit or 
modify any beneficiary's current right to a mandatory distribution of income or principal, a 
mandatory annuity or unitrust interest, a right to withdraw a percentage of the value of the trust or 
a right to withdraw a specified dollar amount provided that such mandatory right has come into 
effect with respect to the beneficiary, except with respect to a second trust which is a 
supplemental needs trust. 
 See also, id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii) (defining “supplemental needs second trust” as one that the trustee 
believes would “allow the disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of government benefits 
than the disabled beneficiary will receive if no distribution is made.”). 
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statute includes special needs decanting provisions allowing the expansion 
of a trustee’s discretion in a supplemental needs second trust.107 
Of course, it is not always necessary for a trustee to utilize the 
provisions of Subsection (d)(4) when decanting for the benefit of a disabled 
beneficiary, but the terms of Subsection (d)(4) are useful where the terms of 
the first trust are such that a trustee cannot otherwise decant to an 
appropriate second trust under Subsections (c) or (d).  Accordingly, when 
considering decanting where a disabled beneficiary is involved, a trustee 
should consider all potential avenues to accomplish the proposed decanting: 
decanting under Subsection (c), when the trustee has absolute discretion; 
decanting under Subsection (d), when the trustee does not have absolute 
discretion, and decanting under Subsection 16.4(d)(4), when the trustee is 
decanting for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary and decanting under 
Subsections (c) and (d) cannot be accomplished. 
Before addressing the specifics of special needs decanting, one 
additional point bears mentioning.  There seems to be some difference of 
opinion between estate planners as to what type of trust is best suited to 
special needs planning—the plain discretionary trust versus the 
supplemental needs trust.  Although supplemental needs trusts are more 
readily identifiable and may help streamline an initial application for 
benefits, discretionary trusts are arguably more flexible and easier to 
administer.  Subsection (d)(4) was drafted broadly to allow for either 
approach.  However, care must be taken to plan for the distinction between 
absolute discretion and no absolute discretion in the decanting context. 
1. Special Needs Decanting with Absolute Discretion 
Naturally, the first inclination when considering decanting in a special 
needs context is to consider decanting under Subsection (d)(4).  Where the 
trustee of the first trust has absolute discretion, however, it may be possible 
to accomplish the trustee’s intended purpose simply by using the decanting 
process found in Subsection (c).  In fact, if a trustee’s “absolute discretion” 
is such that it meets the criteria for a special needs trust found in Section 
15.1 of the Illinois Trust and Trustees Act,108 it may be that it is not 
                                                     
107.  Other states whose decanting statutes permit some sort of expansion of trustee authority in a 
special needs context are: ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157(e) (2014), N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS 
LAW § 10-6.6(n)(1) (2014), VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1(C)(9) (2014), and WIS. STAT. § 
701.0418(2)(a)(2) (2014). 
108.  See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15.1 (2013) (which states, “[a] discretionary trust for the benefit of an 
individual who has a disability that substantially impairs the individual's ability to provide for his 
or her own care or custody and constitutes a substantial handicap shall not be liable to pay or 
reimburse the State or any public agency for financial aid or services to the individual except to 
the extent the trust was created by the individual or trust property has been distributed directly to 
or is otherwise under the control of the individual, provided that such exception shall not apply to 
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necessary to decant at all.  Rather, the beneficiary will likely qualify or 
continue to qualify for governmental benefits under the current trust terms. 
Thus, the first step for any trustee with absolute discretion considering 
special needs decanting should be to consider whether it is necessary to 
decant at all. 
Where the trustee determines that the decanting is necessary, 
Subsection (c) permits the trustee to decant to any trust as long as the 
second trust is to be held for the benefit of one or all of the current 
beneficiaries and one, more than one, or all of the successor and remainder 
beneficiaries of the first trust.  Subsection (c) does not require that all 
beneficiaries of the first trust be legally competent, therefore the trustee 
with absolute discretion may be able to decant for the benefit of a special 
needs beneficiary under Subsection (c) even where one or more of the trust 
beneficiaries is disabled.  Where one beneficiary is disabled, the trustee 
might consider a “partial decanting,” where the trustee decants part of the 
trust principal to a separate trust for the disabled beneficiary.  
One potential problem arises, however, where the disabled beneficiary 
is the sole beneficiary of the first trust.  In this case, the trustee may not be 
able to decant without obtaining court approval.  Recall that Subsection (e) 
defines when a trustee may decant without the approval of a court or the 
beneficiaries.  Subsection (e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  
(e) Notice. An authorized trustee may exercise the power to distribute in 
favor of a second trust under subsections (c) and (d) without the consent 
of the settlor or the beneficiaries of the first trust and without court 
approval if: 
(1) there are one or more legally competent current beneficiaries and one 
or more legally competent presumptive remainder beneficiaries and the 
authorized trustee sends written notice of the trustee’s decision, specifying 
the manner in which the trustee intends to exercise the power and the 
prospective effective date for the distribution, to all of the legally 
competent current beneficiaries and presumptive remainder beneficiaries, 
determined as of the date the notice is sent and assuming non-exercise of 
all powers of appointment; and 
                                                                                                                           
a trust created with the disabled individual's own property or property within his or her control if 
the trust complies with Medicaid reimbursement requirements of federal law.  Notwithstanding 
any other provisions to the contrary, a trust created with the disabled individual's own property or 
property within his or her control shall be liable, after reimbursement of Medicaid expenditures, 
to the State for reimbursement of any other service charges outstanding at the death of the 
disabled individual.  Property, goods and services purchased or owned by a trust for and used or 
consumed by a disabled beneficiary shall not be considered trust property distributed to or under 
the control of the beneficiary.  A discretionary trust is one in which the trustee has discretionary 
power to determine distributions to be made under the trust.”)  
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(2) no beneficiary to whom notice was sent objects to the distribution in 
writing delivered to the trustee within 60 days after the notice is sent 
(“notice period”).109  
Under Subsection (e), a trustee may decant without approval of the 
court or other beneficiaries, but only if the trustee provides the notices 
contemplated above.  To comply with Subsection (e), there must be at least 
one legally competent current beneficiary and one legally competent 
remainder beneficiary of the first trust.  But in the special needs context, if 
the sole beneficiary of the first trust is disabled, there may not be a “legally 
competent” beneficiary of the first trust to whom notice can be given.  Of 
course, this raises the question, what does “legally competent” mean?  The 
Decanting Statute does not define “legally competent,” nor does the Illinois 
Trusts & Trustees Act or the Illinois Probate Act.  A related term, 
“disabled,” is defined in both the Decanting Statute and the Illinois Probate 
Act, although it is not clear that the terms are synonymous. 
The Decanting Statute defines “disabled beneficiary” as:  
[A] current beneficiary, presumptive remainder beneficiary, or successor 
beneficiary of the first trust who the authorized trustee determines has a 
disability that substantially impairs the beneficiary’s ability to provide for 
his or her own care or custody and that constitutes a substantial handicap, 
whether or not the beneficiary has been adjudicated a ‘disabled person.110 
And the Probate Act defines “disabled person” as:  
[A] person 18 years or older who (a) because of mental deterioration or 
physical incapacity is not fully able to manage his person or estate, or (b) 
is a person with mental illness or a person with a developmental disability 
and who because of his mental illness or developmental disability is not 
fully able to manage his person or estate, or (c) because of gambling, 
idleness, debauchery or excessive use of intoxicants or drugs, so spends or 
wastes his estate as to expose himself or his family to want or suffering, or 
(d) is diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal alcohol effects.
111
 
As noted, it is not clear that legally “incompetent” and “disabled” are 
synonymous, and in fact the fact that both terms are used in the Decanting 
Statute seems to indicate that the legislature intended something different 
when it chose to use the term “legally competent” rather than “not 
disabled,” or the like. The legislature is presumed to have purposely used 
the terms it intended, and in fact, at least one Illinois court has highlighted a 
                                                     
109.  Id. § 5/16.4(e) (emphasis added). 
110.  Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii).  
111.  755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-2 (2013).  
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distinction between disability and competency in a statutory context.112  In 
In re Marriage of Kutchins, the court examined whether a man who had 
been declared a “disabled person” and was under the care of a guardian 
could bring a petition for dissolution of marriage.113  The court ruled that he 
could.114  The test for determining “disability,” the court noted, was more 
demanding than the test for determining competency in a dissolution of 
marriage context.115  Although the court limited its ruling to dissolution of 
marriage, the court’s distinction between “disabled” and “incompetent” is 
relevant when considering whether a first trust has at least “one legally 
competent current beneficiar[y]” to whom the trustee can provide notice. 
Assuming that there is not at least one legally competent beneficiary 
to whom the trustee can give notice, the trustee must seek court approval of 
the proposed decanting.116  Where the proposed decanting is simple and 
easily understandable, or where the decanting is deemed absolutely 
necessary, this may be acceptable.  However, the trustee may wish to avoid 
court involvement for a variety of reasons, including cost and time. 
Whatever the reason, if the trustee wishes to decant but cannot without 
court approval, the trustee will have to consider whether decanting is 
necessary and whether other options are available to the trustee to avoid the 
need to decant.  
On the other hand, where the first trust has more than one beneficiary, 
and at least one beneficiary is legally competent, the trustee may send 
notice as contemplated in Subsection (e).  If the trustee receives no 
objection to the notice, the decanting may go forward without court 
approval.117  The trustee could decant to one or more different trusts 
qualifying under Subsection (c). 
2. Special Needs Decanting without Absolute Discretion 
 Where a trustee does not have absolute discretion and that 
limitation on discretion results in a denial of governmental benefits, the 
trustee’s ability to decant is restricted under the general provisions of 
Subsection (d) because the trustee is prohibited from altering the 
beneficiaries and distributive terms of the trust.118  In a common special 
needs situation, mandatory principal distributions or rights to withdraw 
found in an existing first trust may prevent a disabled beneficiary from 
                                                     
112.  In re Marriage of Kutchins, 136 Ill. App. 3d 45, 46–47, 482 N.E.2d 1005, 1006–07 (2d Dist. 
1985). 
113.  Id. at 46, 482 N.E.2d at 1006. 
114.  Id. at 47, 482 N.E.2d at 1007 
115.  Id. at 46–47, 482 N.E.2d at 1006–07. 
116.  See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(f)(1)(b) (2013). 
117.  Id. § 5/16.4(e).  
118.  Id. § 5/16.4(d).  
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collecting governmental benefits.  Because the trustee does not have 
absolute discretion, however, he is prohibited from decanting to a second 
trust eliminating those provisions.  It was this situation precisely that 
spurred lawmakers to draft Section 16.4(d)(4). 
 Nonetheless, there are some circumstances where decanting under 
the general provisions of Subsection (d) within the special needs context 
may be useful.  For example, where the first trust contains restrictions on 
the trustee’s authority to distribute but does not contain mandatory 
distribution provisions, the disabled beneficiary may be able to qualify for 
needs-based benefits under the terms of the first trust.  In that case, the 
trustee may wish to decant to alter certain administrative provisions but 
leave the distributive provisions intact.  Examples would be where the 
trustee wishes to add a trust protector, alter the trust modification 
provisions, alter trust decanting provisions, or alter trust investment 
provisions.  All of these modifications could be accomplished under 
Subsection (d), generally, without resorting to Subsection (d)(4).  
3. Special Needs Decanting under Subsection (d)(4) 
 Where the trustee is unable to decant under Subsection (c) or the 
general provisions of Subsection (d), perhaps because mandatory 
distribution provisions prevent the disabled beneficiary from qualifying for 
needs-based benefits, Subsection (d)(4) exists to fill in the gaps.  
Subsection (d)(4) begins:  
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection (d), the authorized 
trustee may distribute part or all of the principal of a disabled 
beneficiary’s interest in the first trust in favor of a trustee of a second trust 
which is a supplemental needs trust if the authorized trustee determines 
that to do so would be in the best interests of the disabled beneficiary.119 
Note that, unlike decanting under Subsections (c) or (d), a trustee 
decanting under Subsection (d)(4) is not restricted by the amount of 
discretion granted him in the first trust.  Instead, the trustee may decant to a 
supplemental needs second trust, even if the proposed decanting expands or 
restricts his distributive discretion, so long as the decanting is in the “best 
interests” of the “disabled beneficiary” and the trustee believes the 
decanting will allow the disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of 
governmental benefits.120  In fact, a trustee decanting under Subsection 
                                                     
119.  Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(i). 
120.  Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii) (the Decanting Statute does not exhaustively define the term “best interests,” 
but it does note that “best interests” includes “consideration of the financial impact to the disabled 
beneficiary’s family.”)  See also id. (“[d]isabled beneficiary” means “a current beneficiary, 
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(d)(4) may go so far as to eliminate a disabled beneficiary’s mandatory 
distributions of income or principal where doing so would increase the 
beneficiary’s right to collect government benefits.121 
As the goal of Subsection (d)(4) is to increase the disabled 
beneficiary’s ability to receive governmental benefits, the trustee’s power to 
decant to a supplemental needs second trust is deliberately broad.  The 
supplemental needs second trust need not contain any particular “special 
needs” language, and in general, the trust need not take any specific form; 
third party trusts, pooled trusts, and OBRA payback trusts are all valid 
forms for a supplemental needs second trust.122  However there are a few 
requirements to which the second trust must conform in order to ensure that 
Subsection (d)(4) is used only for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary.  
First, the supplemental needs second trust must contain “lesser or 
greater restrictions on the trustee’s power to distribute trust income or 
principal.”123  Thus, a trustee may not decant under Subsection (d)(4) if the 
degree of his discretion will remain unchanged.  In such a case, however, 
decanting to a supplemental needs second trust may not be necessary, as the 
trustee may be able to achieve his purpose—likely to alter administrative 
provisions of the trust—using the general decanting provisions of 
Subsections (c) or (d).   
Further, the trustee must believe that the second trust would “allow the 
disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of governmental benefits 
than the disabled beneficiary will receive if no distribution is made.”124 
Accordingly, even where the trustee’s discretion is altered between the first 
trust and the supplemental needs second trust, if the change does not 
increase or is not likely to increase the degree of governmental benefits the 
disabled beneficiary is eligible to receive, the second trust does not qualify 
as a “supplemental needs second trust,” and decanting under Subsection 
(d)(4) is not possible.  
                                                                                                                           
presumptive remainder beneficiary, or successor beneficiary of the first trust who the authorized 
trustee determines has a disability that substantially impairs the beneficiary’s ability to provide for 
his or her own care or custody and that constitutes a substantial handicap, whether or not the 
beneficiary has been adjudicated a ‘disabled person.’”) See also id. (stating “[s]upplemental needs 
second trust” means “a trust that complies with paragraph (iii) of this paragraph (4) and that 
relative to the first trust contains either lesser or greater restrictions on the trustee's power to 
distribute trust income or principal and which the trustee believes would, if implemented, allow 
the disabled beneficiary to receive a greater degree of governmental benefits than the disabled 
beneficiary will receive if no distribution is made.”). 
121. See id. § 5/16.4(n)(1) (An authorized trustee may not “reduce, limit or modify a beneficiary’s 
current right to a mandatory distribution of income or principal…except with respect to a second 
trust which is a supplemental needs trust.”).  
122. See id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii) (defining “supplemental needs second trust”). 
123.  Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(iii). 
124.  Id. § 5/16.4(d)(4)(ii).  
668 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
 
Additional restrictions are placed on the naming of remainder or 
successor beneficiaries to the supplemental needs second trust.  The 
supplemental needs second trust may name remainder and successor 
beneficiaries “other than the disabled beneficiary’s estate,” however the 
remainder and successor beneficiaries must be the same as those and in the 
same proportions as in the first trust. 
D. Potential Problems with Special Needs Decanting 
Although a trustee’s ability to decant to a supplemental needs second 
trust for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary is deliberately broad, like any 
new statute there remain questions as to its use and applicability.  Many of 
those questions arise in the context of decanting to a payback or pooled 
trust, as discussed below. 
1. Decanting to a Payback Trust 
As noted, Subsection (d)(4) specifically permits a trustee to decant to 
an OBRA payback trust for the benefit of a disabled beneficiary.125 By 
doing so, the disabled beneficiary is eligible for need-based benefits 
immediately, without having to spend down current trust assets, even 
though the first trust was funded with assets belonging to the beneficiary 
himself.126 The signature feature of the OBRA trust, however, is its 
payback requirements. Specifically, to qualify as an OBRA (d)(4)(A) trust, 
the terms of the trust must require that upon the death of the disabled 
beneficiary the State receive “all amounts remaining in the trust…up to an 
amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual 
under a State plan under this subchapter.”127 
                                                     
125.  An OBRA trust is a highly specialized irrevocable trust sanctioned by Federal and Illinois law that 
operates very much like a special needs trust for a person with a disability, but which can be 
funded with the ward’s own assets.  Use of such trusts allows immediate qualification for “need-
based” governmental benefits based on the ward’s disability (“Medicaid”) and also Supplemental 
Security Income (“SSI”) from the Social Security Administration.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§1396p(d)(4)(A) (2014) (defining an OBRA special needs trust); see also 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/15.1 (2013) (providing authority for OBRA trusts in Illinois). 
126.  The OBRA trust mechanism is commonly used where a disabled beneficiary has received a 
settlement or inheritance that prevents the beneficiary from qualifying for need-based benefits.  
Prior to implementation of the OBRA trust concept, disabled individuals who, for example, 
received a settlement from a personal injury suit for the cause of their disability were ineligible 
for need-based benefits until the settlement amount was spent down.  Under the OBRA concept, 
the disabled beneficiary maintains her eligibility for need-based benefits but also maintains the 
ability to access supplemental income if needed.  An expanded discussion of the history OBRA 
trust can be found in the article, Joseph A. Rosenburg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with 
Disabilities: The Development of A Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 
91 (2000). 
127.  42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A) (2014).  
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The requirement that the State be repaid from remaining OBRA trust 
funds upon the death of the disabled beneficiary, and Subsection (d)(4)’s 
specific permission of the use of OBRA trusts might at first appear to be in 
conflict, however, with another part of the Decanting Statute: Subsection 
16.4(o). Subsection 16.4(o) provides:  
(o) Exception. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of 
subsection (n) but subject to the other limitations in this Section, an 
authorized trustee may exercise a power authorized by subsection (c) or 
(d) to distribute to a second trust; provided, however, that the exercise of 
such power does not subject the second trust to claims of reimbursement 
by any private or governmental body and does not at any time interfere 
with, reduce the amount of, or jeopardize an individual’s entitlement to 
government benefits.
128
   
 However, further analysis reveals that Subsection 16.4(o) should 
have no negative impact on one’s ability to decant to a payback trust.  In 
those cases where a payback trust would be required under Subsection 
(d)(4), the trust’s interest would already be subject to a claim or 
reimbursement by a private or governmental body in nearly all cases.  Thus, 
it is not the exercise of decanting power that subjects the trust to such 
claims—the trust was already subject to such claims.  As a consequence, 
Subsection 16.4(o) is most likely not an impediment to payback trust 
decanting. 
 Even if this were not the case, in situations where statutory 
ambiguity arises the intent of the legislature is of paramount importance.129 
That the legislature drafted Subsection (d)(4), and specifically authorized 
decanting to an OBRA payback trust, in contrast to the multitude of states 
whose decanting statutes do not address special needs decanting at all, 
demonstrates that the legislative intent in drafting subsection (o) was not to 
prevent decanting to an OBRA payback trust in a special needs situation, 
but to permit such decanting for the best interests of the disabled 
beneficiary.  
 Moreover, where a general statutory provision conflicts with a 
more specific provision, both relating to the same subject, the specific 
provision controls and should be applied.130  In this case, the general 
provision found in Subsection (o) (“provided, however, that the exercise of 
such power does not subject the second trust to claims of reimbursement by 
any private or governmental body”) conflicts with the specific provision 
found in Subsection (d)(4)(iii) (“where the first trust was created by the 
                                                     
128.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(o) (2013) (emphasis added). 
129.  Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 458-59, 781 N.E.2d 261, 267 (2002). 
130.  People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379, 604 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1992). 
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disabled beneficiary or the trust property has been distributed directly to or 
is otherwise under the control of the disabled beneficiary, the authorized 
trustee may distribute to a “pooled trust” as defined by federal Medicaid 
law for the benefit of the disabled beneficiary or the supplemental needs 
second trust must contain pay back provisions complying with Medicaid 
reimbursement requirements of federal law.”)131  Applying this rule, and 
particularly in light of the purpose of Section (d)(4), the specific provision 
should apply, and decanting to a payback trust permitted.  
2. Notice Requirements when Decanting to a Payback Trust 
As discussed in Section C, supra, a trustee decanting for a disabled 
beneficiary may be required to seek court approval of the decanting if there 
is not at least one legally competent beneficiary to whom the trustee can 
give notice.132  Implicit in any court proceeding under Subsection (f) is the 
requirement that all beneficiaries of the first trust receive notice of the 
proceeding and have an opportunity to object.  But where the first trust is a 
payback trust who must receive notice?  As an OBRA payback trust, the 
terms of first trust must provide for reimbursement to the State upon the 
death of the disabled beneficiary.133  Therefore, since the State has an 
interest in the remainder of the trust assets, is the State a “remainder 
beneficiary” entitled to notice?  Or, alternatively, is the State merely a 
creditor of the trust?  The answer is not clear from the decanting statute, nor 
could any Illinois or related authority be located characterizing the State, in 
an OBRA context, as a beneficiary or creditor.  Absent a more definitive 
answer, a trustee seeking court permission to decant from an OBRA 
payback trust to a second trust may wish to proactively provide notice of all 
court proceedings to the State to ensure compliance with Section 16.4 and 
to ensure that future actions of the trustee or orders of the court are 
enforceable.  
3. Decanting Triggering Payback Provisions 
Another area of uncertainty arises where the disabled beneficiary 
currently owes the State money for Public Aid services rendered, and the 
trustee of the first trust wishes to decant to an OBRA payback trust for the 
disabled beneficiary.  In that situation, it is unclear whether the disabled 
beneficiary’s outstanding liens must be paid back before the trustee may 
decant to the OBRA trust.  In at least one case, In re Estate of Calhoun, a 
                                                     
131.   760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(o) & (d)(4)(iii) (2013).  
132.  Id. § 5/16.4(e)(1). 
133.  42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A) (2014). 
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court found that a disabled beneficiary could not transfer the proceeds of 
her personal injury settlement to an OBRA payback trust without first 
paying an existing lien held by the State.134  The disabled beneficiary, who 
suffered brain injury during birth, received $3,500,000 as a settlement with 
the hospital and physicians who delivered her.135  At the time she received 
the settlement, the disabled had received $223,223.12 in Medicaid benefits 
from the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) for which the State held 
a lien.136  When the disabled beneficiary’s guardian sought to transfer the 
settlement amount into an OBRA trust for the disabled beneficiary’s 
benefit, IDPA objected, arguing that its lien should be paid first prior to the 
OBRA trust being funded.137  The Court agreed, finding that Medicaid 
provisions required the state to collect any amounts, up to the amount of the 
state’s lien, received by a Medicaid recipient as the result of an injury by a 
third party, and that these liens must be paid before an OBRA trust could be 
funded.138 
Calhoun did not involve a proposed decanting, however, and this 
distinction may be important.  One of the general principals of decanting is 
that although the second trust is a separate trust, the grantor of the first trust 
is deemed to be the grantor of the second trust.139  Thus, the second trust 
has characteristics of both a separate trust, and a continuation of the first 
trust.  If this is the case and the second trust is a mere continuation of the 
first trust, it is possible that payback provisions might not be triggered as 
the result of the transfer.  Further, unlike Calhoun, the transfer does not 
come directly from the third-party settlement funds to the beneficiary to the 
OBRA trust, but rather from the trustee of the first trust into what might be 
viewed as a new version of that same trust.  This line is further blurred in 
situations where the decanting occurs before the beneficiary is entitled to 
any distributions under the first trust or where the first trust was settled by a 
third party. 
Subsection (d)(4)(iv) expressly addresses the potential for payback 
provisions, providing “[a] supplemental needs second trust shall not be 
liable to pay or reimburse the State or any public agency for financial aid or 
services to the disabled beneficiary except as provided in the supplemental 
needs second trust.”140  It would appear that this provision was added to 
address this precise question. 
                                                     
134.  In re Estate of Calhoun, 291 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 684 N.E.2d 842, 844 (1st Dist. 1997). 
135.  Id. at 840, 684 N.E.2d at 843.  
136.  Id.  
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at 843, 684 N.E.2d at 845.  
139.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.4(t) (2013) (“The settlor of the first trust is considered for all purposes 
to be the settlor of any second trust established in accordance with this Section.”). 
140.  Id  § 5/16.4(d)(4)(iv). 
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4. Statute of Limitations 
Finally, a word of caution regarding limitations.  The ordinary two-
year statute of limitations for decanting does not run for a person who was 
under a legal disability at the time a notice or report of decanting was sent 
and who then had no personal representative.141  Accordingly, a trustee in 
this situation should exercise caution when considering whether to use court 
ordered decanting.  
E. Decanting Versus Virtual Representation 
Finally, where alterations to a trust are necessary for its desired 
performance, one potential alternative to decanting is the use of a virtual 
representation agreement to alter the terms of the trust by agreement of the 
trustee and beneficiaries.142  From a trustee’s perspective, the use of a 
virtual representation agreement may seem preferable since it amounts to an 
enforceable agreement as to all the beneficiaries, and thus the risk that the 
trustee will be criticized for abusing his discretion may be reduced.  And, in 
fact, the decanting statute specifically highlights virtual representation 
agreements as an additional option to distribute property in further trust. 
Subsection (j) provides:  
Other authority to distribute in further trust.  This Section shall not be 
construed to abridge the right of any trustee to distribute property in 
further trust that arises under the terms of the governing instrument of a 
trust, any provision of applicable law, or a court order.  In addition, 
distribution of trust principal to a second trust may be made by agreement 
between a trustee and all primary beneficiaries of a first trust, acting either 
individually or by their respective representatives in accordance with 
Section 16.1 of this Act.143 
In some situations involving special needs planning, however, 
decanting may be a better planning tool.  Decanting relies upon the 
judgment (and discretion) of the trustee instead of the beneficiaries and 
those representing the beneficiaries.  Virtual representation, on the other 
hand, encourages beneficiaries to band together, but when one or more 
beneficiaries has a disability, there is a risk that no consensus can be 
reached as to how to properly care for the disabled beneficiary.  In those 
instances where there are only a few beneficiaries, it is possible that there 
will be no individual property situated to represent the interests of the 
                                                     
141.  Id. § 5/16.4(u). 
142.  Illinois’s virtual representation statute can be found at 760 ILL. COMP. STAT.  5/16.1 (2013).  
143.  760 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/15/4(j) (2013).  
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disabled beneficiary.  Further, in situations where an OBRA payback trust 
is involved, it is highly unlikely that the practitioner could get the Illinois 
Department to sign a virtual representation agreement.  In these cases, 
decanting may be preferable, even if court involvement may be required.  
In addition, there could be at least some concern that where a 
representative for a disabled beneficiary enters into a virtual representation 
agreement and that agreement operates as the beneficiary’s relinquishment 
of any form of beneficial interest in the trust, the act of signing the 
agreement could be deemed to constitute a transfer for less than adequate 
consideration for purposes of a governmental benefits application and 
might impact approval of that application.  On other hand, with decanting, 
the changes to the trust are made in the trustee’s sole discretion.  One might 
argue that the decanting requirements of providing a disabled beneficiary’s 
representative with notice or even seeking court ordered decanting do not 
rise to the level of voluntarily agreeing to a modification.  Even if the 
beneficiary objects to the decanting after receiving notice and the decanting 
decision comes before a court, the trustee need only prove that the 
decanting “further the purposes of the trust.”144  Once the trustee succeeds 
in this proof, it appears that the act can only be challenged if the trustee is 
acting in bad faith.145  As a result, unlike a beneficiary’s right to refuse a 
proposed virtual representation, there is no unqualified right to object to 
decanting in the hands of the beneficiary.  
F. Conclusion 
  If used correctly, the flexibility afforded by Section (d)(4) of the 
decanting provisions of the Illinois Trusts and Trustees Act can create new 
opportunities for special needs planners.  Although the statute does not 
address all special needs situations, it does add to the list of tools that may 
be used to protect assets for persons with disabilities.  Care should be taken, 
however.  Given the complexity of the statute and the dearth of interpretive 
case law, there remain many unanswered questions as to the statute’s 
application. 
IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE ILLINOIS VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION 
STATUTE 
Significant amendments to the Illinois virtual representation statute, 
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1, went into effect on January 1, 2015.146  These 
                                                     
144.  Id. § 5/16.4(f)(2).  
145.  Id. §§ 5/16.4(f)(3), (u).  
146. See generally Trusts and Trustees Act, Pub. Act No. 98-0946 (effective date January 1, 2015). 
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amendments provide greater certainty as to what matters can be resolved by 
a nonjudicial settlement agreement between the trustee and the 
beneficiaries.  These amendments also expand the ways in which minor, 
disabled or unborn beneficiaries can be represented for purposes of entering 
into a nonjudicial settlement agreement.  
A. A Short History of Illinois Virtual Representation 
In litigating a matter involving a trust or a will, traditionally a party 
could be bound by a court order only if the party was properly represented. 
Wills and trusts, however, frequently have beneficiaries who are minors, 
disabled persons, unborn persons or even persons not yet identified.  Some 
such beneficiaries may have interests that are contingent or even remote. 
Virtual representation
 
is a legal doctrine that permits a party having a 
substantially identical interest and no conflict of interest on a particular 
question or dispute to represent and legally bind a minor, disabled person or 
unborn party, or other beneficiaries with contingent interests. 
The doctrine of virtual representation developed in the U.S. between 
1860 and 1940.  Many of the early cases were from Illinois.  For example, 
Hale v. Hale, held that virtual representation satisfied the necessary parties 
rule by both alleviating the necessity of joining the represented parties and 
by binding the represented parties.147  
1. 1993 Illinois Virtual Representation Statute 
In 1993 the doctrine was extended by statute to private settlement 
agreements by section 16.1 of the Illinois Trusts and Trustees Act.148 
However, the extent of virtual representation under the original statute was 
limited to situations in which all the “primary beneficiaries” were adults 
and not disabled.
  
Further, the statute did not permit the termination of a 
trust and arguably did not permit a substantive reformation of the trust 
terms. 
2. 2010 Illinois Virtual Representation Statute 
Effective January 1, 2010 the Illinois virtual representation statute was 
amended to significantly expand the scope of nonjudicial virtual 
representation (the “2010 Statute”).  Beneficiaries, including primary 
beneficiaries, who are not nondisabled adults may be represented by other 
beneficiaries.  Further, the matters that can be properly addressed by a 
                                                     
147.  146 Ill. 227, 258, 33 N.E. 858, 868 (1893). 
148.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1 (1993). 
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nonjudicial settlement agreement were expanded and to a great extent 
delineated.  Further, the statute also covered trust terminations.149  
3. 2015 Illinois Virtual Representation Statute 
Effective January 1, 2015, the Illinois virtual representation statute is 
further amended (the “2015 Statute”) to expand the concept of virtual 
representation, to clarify the matters that may be
 
addressed by a nonjudicial 
settlement agreement and to make other improvements to the statute.  
B. Overview of Changes to Virtual Representation Statute 
The changes made by the 2015 amendments to the virtual 
representation statute generally fall into four categories: (1) changes to the 
types of matters that can be addressed in a nonjudicial settlement 
agreement; (2) changes to the rules for representation of beneficiaries; (3) 
changes to better define the trusts that are subject to the statute; and (4) 
changes to definitions and other clean up changes.150  
1. Matters that Can be Addressed in Nonjudicial Settlement Agreement 
The 2015 Statute clarifies and modifies the types of matters that can 
be addressed in a nonjudicial settlement agreement. The 2015 Statute:  
(1) Clarifies that the nonexclusive list of types of matters that can 
be dealt with in a nonjudicial settlement agreement is a safe harbor 
list, available without the necessity of satisfying the requirement 
that it be a modification that a court could approve.151    
(2)  Provides that a nonjudicial settlement agreement may address 
the validity of terms of the trust.152    
(3)  Provides that a nonjudicial settlement agreement that grants an 
administrative power or resolves property questions can do so only 
to the extent such change does not conflict with a material purpose 
of the trust.153  
(4)  Clarifies that a nonjudicial settlement agreement may deal with 
removal or appointment of a trustee, trust advisor, investment 
                                                     
149.  See Lyman Welch and Susan Bart, New Law Promotes Private Trust-Administration Agreements, 
97 ILL. B.J. 11 (2009); see also Susan Bart, Illinois Virtual Representation Agreements (2009), 
available at http://www.cepcweb.org/assets/Councils/Chicago-IL/library/Handout.Bart.pdf (last 
visited October 21, 2015) (providing materials to December 16, 2009 presentation to the Chicago 
Estate Planning Council). 
150.  See generally Trusts and Trustees Act, Pub. Act No. 98-0946 (effective date January 1, 2015).  
151. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(A)-(L). 
152.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4)(A). 
153.  Id. §§ 5/16.1(d)(3)(D-E).  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advisor or trust protector, including a plan of succession for such 
offices.154  
(5)  Clarifies that a change of place of administration may also 
change the law governing administration.155    
(6)  Clarifies that disputes that may be resolved by a nonjudicial 
settlement agreement must be bona fide disputes.156  
2. Rules for Representation of Beneficiaries 
The 2015 Statute amends the rules for representation of beneficiaries 
as follows:  
(1)  Allows a parent to act for a child if there is no conflict of interest as to 
the particular question or dispute. 
(2)  Allows an agent under a power of attorney for property to act for the 
principal if there is no conflict of interest as to the particular question or 
dispute.157 
(3)  Clarifies that a specifically named charity can act for itself, but 
requires 60 days prior notice of any nonjudicial settlement agreement to 
the Illinois Attorney General’s Charitable Trust Bureau if a charitable 
interest is involved.158   
(4)  Substitutes “substantially similar interest” for “substantially identical 
interest.”159   
(5)  Clarifies that a guardian, agent or parent representing a beneficiary 
may also represent other beneficiaries with substantially similar interests 
and no conflict of interest with respect to the particular question or 
dispute.160   
(6)  Removes questions about the definition of “primary beneficiary” and 
the interrelationship of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) by combining those 
two subsections into one.161   
  
                                                     
154.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3)(F).   
155.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3)(H). 
156.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3)(J).   
157.  Id. § 5/16.1(a)(4).   
158.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4.5). 
159.  Id. §§ 5/16.1(a)(1) & (6). 
160.  Id. § 5/16.1(a)(6).  
161.  Id. §§ 5/16.1(a)(2-3).   
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3. Trusts Subject to Statute 
The 2015 Statute provides that the virtual representation statute 
applies to trusts administered in Illinois (whether or not Illinois law applies) 
or that are governed by Illinois law as to meaning and effect, unless the 
governing instrument expressly prohibits the use of the statute. Section 
16.1(f).  
4. Definitions and Other Changes 
The 2015 Statute modifies definitions used in the statute as follows:  
(1)  Expands the definition of “interested persons” to include trust 
advisors and protectors when their powers are relevant to the 
particular question or dispute.162  
(2)  Removes questions about the definition of a disabled 
beneficiary by substituting “has legal capacity” for “not 
disabled.”163  
(3)  Adds definitions of “legal capacity” and “disabled person.”164  
C. Matters that Can be Addressed in Nonjudicial Settlement Agreement  
1. Safe Harbor List of Matters 
The 2010 Statute listed eleven matters that may be resolved by a 
nonjudicial settlement agreement.165  The 2010 Statute also provided that 
modifications were valid only to the extent that the terms and conditions of 
the modification could be properly approved under applicable law by a 
court of competent jurisdiction.166  It was unclear whether matters listed in 
section 16.1(d)(4) were subject to the additional requirement that the 
modification be one that could be properly approved under applicable law 
by a court of competent jurisdiction.  Given the sparse and restrictive 
Illinois law on trust modifications, imposing the requirement that the 
modification be one that could be properly approved by a court created 
uncertainty about what matters could be addressed in a nonjudicial 
settlement agreement and might have needlessly restricted nonjudicial 
settlement agreements.  
The 2015 Statute deletes section 16.1(d)(3) of the 2010 Statute to 
make clear that the eleven matters listed in the 2015 Statute section 
                                                     
162.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(1).   
163.  Id. § 5/16.1(a). 
164.  Id. §§ 5/16.1(a)(3)(C) & (D).   
165.   760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4) (2010).  
166.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(3) (2010). 
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16.1(d)(4)(A) through (K) are “safe harbor” matters that can be addressed 
in a nonjudicial settlement agreement, without any inquiry into whether the 
modification could have been approved by a court.167  The 2015 Statute 
then adds as an additional matter that can be addressed by a nonjudicial 
settlement agreement: “Any other matter involving a trust to the extent the 
terms and conditions of the nonjudicial settlement agreement could be 
properly approved under applicable law by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.”168  
2. Validity 
The 2010 Statute listed as a matter that could be resolved by a 
nonjudicial settlement agreement: “interpretation or construction of the 
terms of the trust.”169  The 2015 Statute adds “validity” as an appropriate 
matter for a nonjudicial settlement agreement.170  
3. Grant of Power and Questions Relating to Property 
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to 
grant to a trustee of any necessary or desirable administrative power or to 
resolve questions relating to property or an interest in property held by the 
trust.  The breadth of these two areas arguably was restricted by the 
requirement, deleted in the 2015 Statute, that the modification be one that 
could have been approved by a court.  In order to protect the settlor’s intent, 
the 2015 Statute adds a requirement that any modification that grants the 
trustee an administrative power or resolves a question relating to property 
must not conflict with a clear material purpose of the trust.171  
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts comments on what is a material 
purpose:  
Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a 
purpose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or 
objective on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to a 
beneficiary’s management skills, judgment, or level of maturity.  Thus, a 
court may look for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating that 
the trust arrangement represented to the settlor more than a method of 
allocating the benefits of property among multiple intended beneficiaries, 
or a means of offering to the beneficiaries (but not imposing on them) a 
                                                     
167.  See id. at §§ 5/16.1(d)(4)(A-K). 
168.  Id.  
169.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(A) (2010).  
170.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(A) (2015).  
171.  Id. §§ 5/16.1(d)(4)(D-E).  
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particular advantage.  Sometimes, of course, the very nature or design of a 
trust suggests its protective nature or some other material purpose.172  
4. Trustees and Other Fiduciaries 
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to 
address “resignation or appointment of a trustee.”173  The 2015 Statute 
expands this category as follows:  
(F) Removal, appointment, or removal and appointment of a trustee, trust 
advisor, investment advisor, distribution advisor, trust protector or other 
holder, or committee of holders, of fiduciary or nonfiduciary powers, 
including without limitation designation of a plan of succession or 
procedure to determine successors to any such office.174  
The 2015 Statute applies not just to trustees, but also to trust advisors 
and protectors, regardless of whether they hold their powers in a fiduciary 
capacity.  Further, the 2015 Statute makes it clear that the nonjudicial 
settlement agreement can not only address the immediate succession of 
fiduciaries, advisors and protectors, but can also designate procedures for 
future fiduciary succession.  
5. Change of Law Governing Administration  
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to 
transfer a trust’s principal place of administration.175  Depending upon the 
particular facts, it can be unclear whether transferring a trust’s principal 
place of administration changes the law governing administration of the 
trust.176  The 2015 Statute specifically permits the nonjudicial settlement 
agreement to change the law governing administration of the trust.177  
6. Bona Fide Disputes  
The 2010 Statute permitted a nonjudicial settlement agreement to 
resolve disputes or issues related to administration, investment, distribution 
or other matters.  The 2015 Statute clarifies that these disputes must be 
                                                     
172.  Restatement (Third) Trusts, § 65 cmt. d (2007). 
173.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(F) (2010). 
174.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(F) (2015). 
175.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(H) (2010).  
176.  See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 271, 272 (1971). 
177.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(d)(4)(H) (2015). 
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bona fide.178  Thus an artificially manufactured “dispute” will not serve as 
the basis for modifying a trust under the virtual representation statute.  
7. Matters Unchanged in 2015 Statute  
In the 2015 Statute the following matters continue to be matters that 
may be resolved by a nonjudicial settlement agreement: (1) approval of a 
trustee’s report or accounting; (2) exercise or nonexercise of any power by 
a trustee; (3) determination of a trustee’s compensation; (4) liability or 
indemnification of a trustee for an action relating to the trust; and (5) 
modification of the terms of the trust pertaining to administration of the 
trust.179  
D. Representation of Beneficiaries  
The 2010 Statute permitted certain individual beneficiaries who 
cannot represent themselves to be represented by other specific 
beneficiaries.180  The 2010 Statute also provided that certain classes of 
beneficiaries may represent other classes of beneficiaries.181  
1. Guardian Represents Beneficiary 
If a beneficiary is a minor, disabled or unborn person, under both the 
2010 Statute and the 2015 Statute, the court appointed guardian of the 
estate of the beneficiary, or if none, the guardian of the person for the 
beneficiary, represents the beneficiary.182 
2. Agent May Represent Principal 
If a disabled beneficiary does not have a court appointed guardian, the 
2015 Statute allows an agent under a power of attorney for property to 
represent such beneficiary if the agent has authority to act with respect to 
the particular question or dispute and does not have a conflict of interest 
with respect to the particular question or dispute.183  
An Illinois Statutory Short Form Power of Attorney for Property 
should give an agent the power to enter into a nonjudicial settlement 
agreement.  The Illinois Power of Attorney for Property authorizes the 
                                                     
178.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4)(J). 
179.  Id. § 5/16.1(d)(4)(B); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(C); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(G); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(I); § 5/16.1(d)(4)(K).  
180.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(a)(4) (2010).  
181.  Id.  
182.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(a)(4) (2015). 
183.  Id.  
2015]  Survey of Illinois Law: Trusts and Estates 681 
agent to enter into “estate transactions,” which are defined in the statute to 
include authorization to “assert any interest in and exercise any power over 
any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; . . . and, in general, 
exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal 
could if present and under no disability.”184  Although the power of attorney 
statute provides that an agent may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or 
amendable by the principal, a modification of a trust by a nonjudicial 
settlement agreement should not be considered to be a trust amendment. 
3. Parent May Represent Child  
Under the 2015 Statute, a parent may represent a minor, disabled or 
unborn child if there is no conflict of interest between the child and the 
parent, and if the child does not have a guardian or agent who is authorized 
to act.185  The parent need not have any interest in the trust.186  If both 
parents are qualified to represent the child and the parents disagree, the 
parent who is a lineal descendant of the settlor of the trust, or if none, the 
parent who is also a beneficiary of the trust, is entitled to represent the 
child.187  
4. Representation by Beneficiary with Substantially Similar Interest 
Under the 2010 Statute, if a minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary was 
not represented by a guardian, the minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary 
could be represented by another beneficiary with a substantially identical 
interest and no conflict of interest.  Under the 2015 Statute, if a minor, 
disabled or unborn beneficiary is not represented by a guardian, agent or 
parent, the minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary may be represented by 
another beneficiary with a substantially similar interest and no conflict of 
interest.  Note that the 2015 Statute requires only that the interests of the 
represented beneficiary and the representor beneficiary be “substantially 
similar,” not “substantially identical.”  Both the determination of whether 
the beneficiaries have substantially similar interests and the determination 
of whether there is a conflict of interest should be made with respect to the 
particular matter being addressed.188  A presumptive remainderman may be 
able to represent alternative remaindermen with respect to approval of the 
trustee’s account, for example, but not with respect to interpretation of the 
remainder provision of the trust.  “Substantially similar” does not require 
                                                     
184.  755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3-4(n) (2014). 
185.  760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.1(a)(5) (2015).  
186.  Id.  
187.  Id.  
188.  See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 304 cmt. (2010). 
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identical interests.  For example, if trusts for the settlor’s grandchildren are 
the presumptive remainder beneficiaries, but the terms of the trusts vary as 
to whether income distributions are required, the age for withdrawal, and 
the extent of any power of appointment granted to the beneficiary, the 
grandchildren’s interests may still be substantially similar as to matters 
other than the construction of the specific trust terms defining the 
grandchildren’s interests.  
5. Charity May Represent Self  
Both the 2010 Statute and the 2015 Statute provide that the Illinois 
Attorney General may represent charities or charitable purposes that are not 
specifically named or otherwise represented.189  The 2015 Statute now 
explicitly states that a charity that is specifically named as a beneficiary 
may act for itself.190  Both statutes state that the Illinois Attorney General 
reserves the right to file an action or take other steps that it deems advisable 
at any time to enforce or protect the general public interest as to a trust that 
provides a beneficial interest or expectancy for one or more charities or 
charitable purposes whether or not a specific charity is named.191  
6. Representative May Represent Other Beneficiaries 
If a minor, disabled or unborn beneficiary (Beneficiary 1) is not 
represented by a guardian, agent or parent, under both statutes Beneficiary 
1 could be represented by another beneficiary (Beneficiary 2) with a 
substantially similar (or identical) interest and no conflict of interest.  What 
was not clear under the 2010 Statute was whether Beneficiary 1 could be 
represented by Beneficiary 2’s representative (e.g., Beneficiary 2’s 
guardian).  The 2015 Statute makes it clear that Beneficiary 1 can be 
represented by Beneficiary 2’s guardian, agent or parent, provided that 
Beneficiary 1 and Beneficiary 2 have substantially similar interests and no 
conflict of interest.192  
7. Eliminates Primary Beneficiary Representation  
The 2010 Statute provided for two types of class representation.  First, 
if all primary beneficiaries of a trust were adults who were not disabled or 
were represented, the primary beneficiaries as a class could represent all 
other beneficiaries who would become primary beneficiaries only by reason 
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of surviving a primary beneficiary.  Second, if all presumptive remainder 
beneficiaries were adults who were not disabled or were represented, the 
presumptive remainder beneficiaries as a class could represent all other 
beneficiaries who have successor, contingent or other future interests in the 
trust.  
Under the statute, a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement requires 
the consent of all “interested persons.”193  “Interested persons” includes all 
persons and parties whose consent or joinder would be required in order to 
achieve a binding settlement were the settlement to be approved by the 
court.194  Thus a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement requires that all 
successor, contingent or other future beneficiaries be represented, not just 
the beneficiaries who would become primary beneficiaries by reason of 
surviving a primary beneficiary.  Consequently in almost all cases the class 
of presumptive remainder beneficiaries would need to consent to the 
nonjudicial settlement agreement, and as they would represent all 
beneficiaries with more remote interests, there would be no need to rely on 
primary beneficiary representation.  The 2015 Statute eliminates primary 
beneficiary representation because it is unnecessary and causes confusion.  
E. Trusts Subject to Statute 
The 2015 Statute expressly states that it applies to a trust that is 
governed by Illinois law with respect to the meaning and effect of its terms 
or that is administered in Illinois.195  The 2015 Statute also states that it 
shall be construed as pertaining to the administration of a trust, thus 
presumably making it applicable to any trust that is governed by Illinois law 
for purposes of administration.196  
A trust may by express language making specific reference to Section 
16.1 prohibit the application of the virtual representation statute.197  Id.  
VI. Definitions 
1. Interested Persons.  
In light of the expansion of divided trusteeship, under which persons 
other than the trustee may have some of the powers traditionally exercised 
by a trustee, the 2015 Statute expands the definition of “interested person” 
to include “a trust advisor, investment advisor, distribution advisor, trust 
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protector or other holder, or committee of holders, of fiduciary or 
nonfiduciary power, if the person then holds powers material to a particular 
question or dispute to be resolved or affected by a nonjudicial settlement 
agreement.”198  
2. Disability and Incapacity.  
The 2010 Statute provided for representation of a beneficiary who was 
disabled, but did not define disability.  In addition, the 2010 Statute 
provided for class representation if all presumptive remainder beneficiaries 
were either adults and not disabled, or had representatives.  It was unclear 
whether “disability” meant legal disability, in which case an adult who was 
not adjudicated disabled but who lacked capacity to understand the effect of 
a nonjudicial settlement agreement, might not be disabled and eligible to be 
represented by another beneficiary with a substantially identical interest.  
The 2015 Statute adds the following definitions of “disabled person” 
and “legal capacity”:  
(C) “Disabled person” as of any date means either a disabled person 
within the meaning of Section 11a-2 of the Probate Act of 1975 or a 
person who, within the 365 days immediately preceding that date, was 
examined by a licensed physician who determined that the person lacked 
the capacity to make prudent financial decisions, and the physician made a 
written record of the physician’s determination and signed the written 
record within 90 days after the examination.  
(D) A person has legal capacity unless the person is a minor or a disabled 
person.199  
The Illinois guardianship statute defines disabled person to include an 
adult who (a) because of mental deterioration or physical incapacity is not 
fully able to manage his person or estate, or (b) is a person with mental 
illness or a person with a developmental disability and who because of his 
mental illness or developmental disability is not fully able to manage his 
person or estate, or (c) because of gambling, idleness, debauchery or 
excessive use of intoxicants or drugs, so spends or wastes his estate as to 
expose himself or his family to want or suffering, or (d) is diagnosed with 
fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal alcohol effects.200  
Thus it is clear under the 2015 Statute that a person whom a physician 
has determined lacks the capacity to make prudent financial decisions, but 
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who has not been adjudicated disabled, may be represented by an agent, 
parent or another beneficiary with a substantially similar interest and no 
conflict of interest with respect to the particular question or dispute.  
G. Conclusion 
The doctrine of virtual representation is a valuable tool for trustees, 
trust beneficiaries and their legal counsel.  Virtual representation, coupled 
with authority to enter into nonjudicial settlement agreements, has potential 
to reduce expenses and facilitate the resolution of disputes and operating 
difficulties in trust administration.  
The 2015 amendments to the Illinois virtual representation statute 
make significant improvements to the statute, particularly by permitting 
beneficiaries to be represented by parents or agents under a power of 
attorney, and by clarifying the matters that may be resolved by a 
nonjudicial settlement agreement.  
 
 

